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IV.

JURISDICTION

The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter
pursuant to U.C.A. §78-2a-3(2)(h).
This is a final judgment of dismissal of Appellant's Verified
Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce.

The lower court initially

had jurisdiction over the case pursuant to Appellee's domesticating
her entire California Decree of Dissolution in the Fifth District
Court in and for Washington County, Utah.

1

V.

A.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES FOR REVIEW

ISSUE FOR REVIEW: JURISDICTION OF UTAH COURT
DOMESTICATION OF ENTIRE FOREIGN DECREE

AFTER

Where Plaintiff, who resides in California, filed in Utah
district court and served upon Defendant, her former Husband and
Utah resident, a Notice of Entry of Foreign Judgment as to
Plaintiff's

entire

California

Decree

of

Divorce,

thereby

domesticating her entire California Decree of Divorce in that same
Utah district court, and thereupon sought additional equitable
relief from that same Utah district court against Defendant, DID
THE LOWER COURT ERR in dismissing Defendant's affirmative defense
of materially changed circumstances, brought through a Verified
Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce, holding that the Court lacked
subject matter and personal jurisdiction as to Utah resident's
Petition to Modify while holding him responsible for California
Plaintiff's claims which arose out of the same fully domesticated
Decree?
B.

STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW

The Utah cases addressing subject matter jurisdiction are
consistent in reviewing the lower court's conclusion of law in
2
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C.

ISSUE PRESERVED IN TRIAL COURT

The issue was preserved in trial court [Record, p. 37] through
Appellants "Memorandum of Points and Authorities With Regard To
Jurisdiction of a Foreign Decree," and through oral argument [Dec.
13 x96 Tr. 3-8].
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS A N D STATUTES W H O S E INTERPRETATION
IS DETERMINATIVE OF THIS APPEAL OR OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE TO
THIS APPEAL

A.
1.

CONSTITUTIONAL

PROVISIONS:

CONSTITUTION OF T H E UNITED STATES:
^1

A

™end V:

No
person
shall...be
deprived
of
life,
liberty, ->r proo-without di :t.e process of
law.
hi

Amend XIV:
i i or shall any State deprive any
person
of
life,
liberty,
or
property, without d u e process of
law; nor deny to any persoi it within
its
jurisdiction
the
equal
protection of t h e laws.

2.

STATE 01 IJ I i Ill •

CONSTITUTION
a]

Art. I £

D u e Process of l a w ] .
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B.

STATUTES:

]

UTAH CODE ANN. §78-22a-2
5

\Foreign

Judgment A c t ]

(1)
As used in this chapter, "foreign
judgment11 means any judgment, decree, or order
of a court of the United States or of any
other court whose acts are entitled to full
faith and credit in this state.
(2)
A copy of a foreign
judgment
authenticated
in
accordance
with
an
appropriate act of Congress or an appropriate
act of Utah may be filed with the clerk of any
district court in Utah.
The clerk of the
district
court
shall treat the
foreign
judgment in all respects as a judgment of a
district court of Utah.
(3) A foreign judgment filed under this
chapter has the same effect and is subject to
the same procedures, defenses, enforcement,
satisfaction, and proceedings for reopening,
vacating, setting aside, or staying as a
judgment of a district court of this state.
2.

UTAH CODE ANN. §30-3-5(7)(g)(i) [Alimony Modification!:
The Court has continuing jurisdiction to make
substantive changes and new orders regarding
alimony based on a substantial material change
in circumstances not foreseeable at the time
of the divorce.
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COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION IN LOWER

Plaint if f . Appr • . ee

Dorerid

T

oL
(hr-reafte

Banklei

-HusbaiK.

wtertw

nereafte

CULKT

:x-Wife")

Defendant ' ?\r ~el lant

-.•. .*>. . . December/

Superior Court (San Bernardino County; , L R*- • rd.

fc

~ in

, "Judgment r-

Dissolution11].

Ex-Wife later sought to collect what she claimed

to be unpaid alimony and obtained extension of alimony from October
1, 1995 through September

30, 1999, through an "Order After

Hearing", issued by the above California Superior Court on or about
April 2, 1996. [Record, p. 11, "Order After Hearing."] Ex-Husband
was not present at the California hearing.

He had moved to Utah

and because of a bankruptcy of the party he had sold his business
and was unable to pay alimony and had a material change in
circumstances.

Tr 6: 13-24; Record, p. 29, pg. 5 (Verified

Petition to Modify Decree Divorce).
Ex-Wife then domesticated the case in the Fifth Judicial
District

Court, Washington

County, Utah

and

sought not only

enforcement of the California judgment but also an order to show
cause (Record p. 22-24) and request for attorneys fees in the Utah
Court.

See also Record pp 16-17, "Notice of Filing Foreign

Judgment" and Record pp. 18-21, "Motion for Order To Show Cause"
and "Affidavit In Support of Order to Show Cause".

Ex-Husband

sought equitable relief in the same Utah case by filing a Verified
Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce Record p. 28 and served same
on Ex-Wife.
"Answer."

Record pp 3 3-35.

Ex-Wife objected.

Record, p. 49,

After briefing and argument, the Utah District Court

dismissed Ex-Husband's Verified Petition for lack of subject matter
and personal jurisdiction, acknowledging full faith and credit for
8

the California alimony judgment, for the California-based Ex-Wife,
while refusing to accept jurisdiction in that same case as to
claims raised by the Utah-resident Ex-Husband before that same Utah
court on alimony issues arising out of the Decree which Ex-Wife
domesticated in Utah.

Record p. 54, "Order of Dismissal."

Ex-Husband then filed his Notice of Appeal to this Court.
Record p. 57.

9

VIII.

SUMMARY OP ARGUMENT

Appellant maintains that he, a Utah resident, should have at
least as much of a right to defend himself

as Appellee, a

California resident, has to prosecute him in a Utah district court.
This is especially so after Appellee chose the Utah district court
to domesticate not only the one-year alimony award which had been,
reduced to judgment in California, but instead domesticated the
entire Judgment

of Dissolution

[See Record, p.

16], thereby

rendering the Utah Foreign Judgment Act applicable to the entire
decree of divorce.

The U.F.J.A. renders a foreign judgment filed

under the Act subject to the same procedures, defenses, reopening,
setting aside, etc. as a judgment of a district court in Utah. See
U.C.A. §78-22a-2(3). The lower court should have allowed Appellant
to defend against a show cause order and attorneys fees award
brought in addition to an enforcement action, and should also have
allowed Appellant to file a Verified Petition To Modify Decree of
Divorce,

since

the

entire

domesticated under the

decree

U.F.J.A.

of

divorce

was

now

fully

Instead the district court held

that it lacked both subject matter and personal jurisdiction to
allow such a "re-opening".
Appellant believes the Utah Court gave the out-of-state party
more "full faith and credit" than it offered him, denied him access
10

to the Courts in violation of UTAH CONST. Art. I §11; violated his
due process by not allowing him an opportunity to be fully heard on
why he could not pay the alimony sought by Appellee, and in giving
a California resident access to courts and due process and denying
him his, also violated his due process, equal protection, and
privileges and immunities under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment
to the Constitution of the United States.
All Appellant seeks here is an opportunity to be heard in his
own state court on the same matter that his Ex-Wife brought against
him in his own state court.

11

X.

ARGUMENT

A. APPELLEE SUBJECTED HERSELF AND HER ENTIRE DECREE OF
DISSOLUTION BY CHOOSING TO DOMESTICATE THAT DECREE IN UTAH
DISTRICT COURT
Plaintiff-Appellee
Appellant

Jack

Bankler

Dorena

Bankler,

(hereafter

ex-wife

"Ex-Wife"

respectively), is a California resident.
resident.

of

and

Defendant-

"Ex-Husband",

Ex-Husband is a Utah

Ex-Wife sought enforcement of part of a prospective

alimony award [record at 11:22-25] in Utah.
limiting

her

enforcement

to

past

However, rather than

unpaid

alimony,

Ex-Wife

domesticated her entire California Decree of Dissolution in the
Fifth District Court in and for Washington County, State of Utah.
Record, p. 16.

Ex-Wife thus domesticated far more than a mere

enforcement order.

Then Ex-Wife sought an Order to Show Cause in

Utah [Record, p. 18] and request for Attorneys Fees [Record, p.
23] .
Ex-Husband Jack Bankler had good reason why he had not paid
alimony and could not pay alimony in the future.

See Record at 28,

et seq., Verified Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce, wherein ExHusband under oath explains why he is not receiving the funds from
sale

of

his

assignee].

chiropractic
This

business

is a material

[bankruptcy

of his

debtor-

change of circumstances.

Mr.

Bankler believed he should be able to explain that to the Court and
12

modify the now fully domesticated decree of dissolution.
2.

UTAH FOREIGN JUDGMENT ACT

By domesticating the entire California decree of dissolution
in the Utah district court pursuant to the Utah Foreign Judgment
Act, the entire decree became subject to Mr. Bankler's re-opening
the question of alimony, under provisions of that same Act.
The Utah Foreign Judgment Act holds, at U.C.A. §78-22a-2(3),
that
A foreign judgment filed under this chapter has the
same effect and is subject to the same procedures,
defenses, enforcement, satisfaction, and proceedings for
reopening, vacating, setting aside, or staying as a
judgment of a district court of this state. [Emphasis
added].
Appellant sought to reopen the decree of dissolution by way of
his Verified Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce. Under the clear
language of the U.F.J.A., he should have been able to.
3.
FULL FAITH AND CREDIT AS APPLIED DOES NOT NEGATE
APPELLANTf S CLAIM TO JURISDICTION IN UTAH COURT
In the Order Of Dismissal [Record, 54] the district court
judge stated that the lower court "has jurisdiction to give full
faith and credit to the Judgment entered by the California Superior
Court which has been domesticated in the above-entitled Court."
Appellant does not dispute that foreign judgments should be given
full faith and credit, but they should not be given more than full
faith and credit.

A Utah decree which is what the California
13

decree became upon Ex-Wife's compliance with the Utah Foreign
Judgment Act, should also be given at least as much faith and
credit as the California decree.

If not, there arises an Equal

Protection problem, to say the least.
This raises the question, "is jurisdiction proper then in two
venues at once?"

Appellant suggests that it is, if the parties

invoke multiple jurisdiction under a lawful foreign judgment act.
Appellant is not seeking to set aside the California decree under
Rule 60(b), U.R.C.P., for any reason.

He is merely seeking to

respond to the broad issues raised not by him but by Ex-Wife when
she chose to use the Utah Court not only to enforce a limited
judgment of past alimony award but to domesticate her entire
decree, and then go even beyond that and seek a new contempt order
and a new attorneys fee award in. Utah.
The U.F.J.A. appears to be subject to interstate uniformity of
enforcement under U.C.A. §78-22a-8:
This chapter shall be construed to effectuate the general
purpose to make uniform the law of those states which
enact it.
Thus the U.F.J.A. appears to be a form of statutory full faith
and credit. Appellant accordingly relies on the U.F.J.A. to afford
him the privileges and immunities of United States citizenship,
including being given full faith and credit in his own forum when
a non-resident attacks him in his own state.
14

4. PERSONAL JURISDICTION ALSO ATTACHED WHEN EX-WIFE CONSENTED
TO USE UTAH COURTS, DOMESTICATED HER ENTIRE DECREE OF DIVORCE,
AND WAS THEN DULY SERVED PROCESS BY EX-HUSBAND ON HIS MODIFICATION
PETITION
The court had subject matter jurisdiction over the Petition to
Modify because of Ex-Wife's domestication in Utah of the entire
decree, as analyzed elsewhere. The Court had personal jurisdiction
over Mr. Bankler, Ex-Husband, because (1) he was a Utah resident;
(2) the act complained of arose in Utah and applied to Ex-Wife,
thus establishing "minimum contacts11.

(See Arguello v. Industrial

Woodworking Mach. Co., 838 P.2d 1120 (Utah 1992), and because ExWife consented by bringing foreign decree.

Furthermore, Ex-Wife

Dorena Bankler was personally served in Utah by Gary Stubbs, a
licensed process server.

See Record, p. 35 (Return of Service), and

p. 49 (Ex-Wife's Answer to Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce).

B.

THE LOWER COURTf S DENIAL OF JURISDICTION RE: APPELLANT f S
PETITION TO MODIFY ALSO ABRIDGED APPELLANTf S RIGHTS TO
OPEN COURTS UNDER UTAH CONSTITUTION

The Utah Constitution, at Art. I, §11, states:
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an
injury done to him in his person, property or reputation,
shall have remedy by due course of law, which shall be
administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and no
person shall be barred from prosecuting or defending
before any tribunal in this State, by himself or counsel,
any civil cause to which he is a party.
Appellant Jack Bankler was entitled to reopen the issue of
15

alimony in the Utah Court after his Ex-Wife chose to domesticate
her entire decree of dissolution in the Utah district court.

(See

Utah Foreign Judgment Actf supra, at IX-A-2 above).
As established earlier, Mrs. Bankler's domestication of her
entire divorce decree enables Mr. Bankler to re-open that decree,
and

modify

the

alimony

obligation

in

light

of

his

changed

circumstances.
This fact situation differs from that found

in Holm v.

Smilowitz. 840 P. 2d 157 (Utah Ct.App. 1992) . In Holm, a Utah court
erroneously denied her motion for relief of judgment through a Rule
60(b) motion. In Holm the commissioner and district court erred in
enforcing an Ohio order which had not been properly domesticated in
Utah, contrary to the facts in the instant case.
However, Holm is applicable to the extent that since Appellant
did comply with the U.F.J.A., the Utah court should exercise
jurisdiction and should allow Appellant a remedy.

The Utah Court

of Appeals in Holm made it clear that "two states may have
simultaneous concurrent jurisdiction" (Holm at 3).
Simply because California has concurrent jurisdiction on the
matter Ex-Wife elected and consented to domesticate in Utah is not
a valid reason to deny Appellant his access to the courts in his
home state—Utah—especially on issues arising out of the same
decree of divorce which Ex-Wife chose to domesticate in Utah, when
16

she could have left the divorce decree in California and simply
domesticated her back-alimony judgment, obtained in California.

C.

THE LOWER COURTf S REFUSAL TO EXERCISE JURISDICTION
OVER APPELLANT'S PETITION TO MODIFY ALSO DENIED HIM DUE
PROCESS, EQUAL PROTECTION, AND PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES
UNDER THE CONSTITUTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES AND OF UTAH
1.

Due Process Denial

The Constitution of the State of Utah holds, at Article I §7,
that "no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law.11
The term "Due process of law" means, among other things, that
a party "shall have his day in court."
Utah 253, 21 P.994 (Utah 1889).

Jensen v. Union Pac. Ry, 6

Further, Appellant was at risk of

losing both liberty and property through Ex-Wife's Order to Show
Cause brought in Utah after domesticating her Decree of Dissolution
in Utah.

[Record, p. 22 "Order to Show Cause."]

Alimony and

attorneys fees sought are certainly "property;" thirty day jail
sentence against Appellant [Nov. 15, 1996 Tr. 7:4-5] is certainly
a "liberty" interest.
In the instant case, Appellant was denied his day in court
when the Court dismissed his Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce
for lack of jurisdiction, and subjected Appellant to jail and
monetary loss without a chance to show why changed circumstances
17

justified

"reopening"

of

the

alimony

award

in

the

decree

of

dissolution domesticated under the U.F.J.A. by Appellee.
Likewise,

Appellant's

rights

under

the

United

States

Constitution, amends V and XIV, were abridged for the same reasons
and under the same basic analysis.

Amendment V states that "no

person shall...be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law."
the States in Sec. 1:

Amendment XIV makes the above applicable to
"nor shall any State deprive any person of

life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."
By denying Appellant jurisdiction to have his day in court to
refute Appellee's contentions that he was still able to pay the
alimony awarded in 1990 in California, and making him subject to
incarceration

and attorneys

fees, the Utah

lower court

denied

Appellant's fundamental property and liberty interest.

2.

Denial of Equal Protection

...nor shall any State....deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
CONST. UNITED STATES amend, XIV.
In the instant case, the lower court gave full faith and
credit to a California resident who brought her entire case to
Utah, and denied the Utah resident defending against that case a
chance to re-open the Domesticated Decree of Divorce. Appellee had
her day in court, but Appellant did not have his day in court,
18

despite the clear language of the U.F.J.A..
The parties were not treated equally.

The reason they were

not treated equally arose out of their residences in different
states.

Out-of-state residency can be a "suspect classification"

for equal protection analysis purposes.

In Shapiro v. Thompson,

394 U.S. 618, 22 L.Ed.2d. 600, 89 S.Ct. 1322, the Supreme Court
held as unlawful a residency requirement for a party to obtain
public assistance benefits because the classification inhibited
movement between the states.

The reasoning in Shapiro is that

there is no second class citizen status on account of state
residency.

Citizens of California and Utah should be treated

equally where there is state action.

By hearing the out-of-state

Appellee's

jurisdiction

complaints

but

denying

to

the

Utah

resident's defensive pleadings, the lower court denied Mr. Bankler
his Constitutionally-mandated equal protection of the laws.

19

X.

CONCLUSION

The lower court, in denying Appellant jurisdiction to reopen
a domesticated decree of divorce, erred.

The lower court also

erred because the consequences of its dismissal of Appellant's
Verified Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce also denied Appellant
his rights to open court, due process, and equal protection under
the Constitutions and laws of both the State of Utah and of the
United States.
Appellant seeks correction of this error, and respectfully
requests that the Appellate Court reverse the dismissal and remand
the case back to the Fifth District Court in and for Washington
County with instructions to allow him to proceed on his Petition to
Modify Decree of Divorce.
Respectfully submitted this

<p\ ~~ day of

,^xe/pyru^t^c^

H

1997.

HUNTSMAN & CHRISTENSEN

R^^IAYTjZfo 'HUNTSMAN
Attorney for Defendant
Appellant

20

and

,

XI.

NOTICE OF NO ADDENDUM

This Brief contains NO ADDENDUM.
The three court transcripts and entire court record have been
forwarded to the above-entitled court by the court reporter and the
trial court clerk, respectively.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE BY J1AILING
I do h e r e b y c e r t i f y t h a t on t h e&
,
day of September, 1997,
I mailed two true and correct copies of the above and foregoing
BRIEF OF APPELLANT, including Notice of No Addendum, by placing
same in the United States Mail, first-class postage prepaid, to the
following, to wit:

Ronald L. Read
HUGHES & READ
187 North 100 West
St. George, Utah 84770

LYTOtf HUNTSMAN
>rney
for
Defendant
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